AN ELEVEN-POINT PLAN FOR THE CONGO:
THE SEARCH FOR A LONG-TERM POLITICAL SOLUTION

Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the current crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) did not simply sprawl out of the failure by Mr. Kabila to keep past agreements. Indeed, few may have questioned the soundness and the appropriateness of alleged agreements: three billion dollars in war dividends and the Kivu region as a grant. The current crisis in DRC is an institutional crisis and refers as much to a lack of legitimacy by the government in power in Kinshasa. It is indeed safe to assume that this crisis might not have occurred had the country embarked on a path to an open, pluralistic and institution-based society over the last fourteen months. Thus, to deal effectively with this crisis and to insure a long-term stability not only in Congo but in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region as a whole, a political solution is needed and some institutional mechanisms to implement such a solution need to be worked out. It is to such an end that we propose the following eleven-point plan:

1.


First and foremost, Mr. Kabila has to make a formal and binding statement outlining his desire to reach out to all the country's political forces and to form a government of national unity.
2.





A Special Political Conference on Congo (SPCC) shall be organized in some neutral country (with a democratically elected government) to which will be convened the government of Congo and a select number of delegates from the major Congolese political organizations, churches, and NGO's. Countries with a historical tie to Congo (Belgium, France, and the US) as well as other interested parties (countries and institutions) will send delegates with an observer status. The conference shall be held under the auspices of the United Nations.
3.


A general cease-fire shall be negotiated and implemented no later than at the onset of the conference. For a cease-fire to be productive, parties to the conflict need to have the sense that their grievances will be dealt with appropriately.
4.

The government of the Congo will lift the ban on the activities of political parties and free all political prisoners no later than at the onset of the conference.
5.


The Special Political Conference on Congo (SPCC) will adopt an overall political plan for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and most importantly for moving the country on to a pluralistic, democratic and law-abiding society.
6.





The SPCC will elect a Prime Minister for the transitional period. The SPCC could choose to confirm the Prime Minister elected by the National Sovereign Conference. The final form of government will be defined by the Constitution of the Third Republic, and the fact that there will be a prime minister for the transition period shall in no way predetermine the form of government in the new Congo. However, during the transitional period a premiership is necessary to provide for balance to the presidency.
7.




The SPCC will approve the formation of a government of national unity, of an electoral commission, and of a constitutional commission. The mandate of the government of national unity will be to work for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and to prepare for the holding of free and fair elections in nine to fifteen months after the end of the Conference and under the supervision of the United Nations.
8.

The SPCC will approve the formation of a transitional legislative body. Such a body could be made up of a limited number of delegates in a mix of regional and institutional representation.
9.

The SPCC will amend the Charter from the National Sovereign Conference (NSC) to serve as the Charter for the transitional period.
10.

The United Nations will send a peace-keeping force to oversee the cease-fire and to serve as an international guarantee for the process of political normalization.
11.

The SPCC will approve the calendar for the constitutional referendum and for local, regional, legislative, and presidential elections.

We deeply believe that the cost of implementing such a plan will be much lower than the cumulative expenses that the international community will be obliged to incur repeatedly in the Congo if the Congolese problem is not dealt with appropriately.