TORMENT IN THE HEART OF AFRICA:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES.
by
Alafuele M. Kalala
Washington, DC, July 8, 2000

An appeal to the International Community, to African governments in particular, to deal efficiently and resolutely with the crisis that is raging now in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region of Africa.

1. PREAMBLE
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, is, for four years now, undergoing the worst crisis since the end of the sad adventure of the Independent State of the Congo in 1908 in which year it became formally a colony of the Kingdom of Belgium. Indeed, just a bit over fourteen months after the end of the rebellion that brought an end to the regime of Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, one of the most corrupt and most deplorable regimes in the history of the world, Congo was once again embroiled in a war which, in the space of a few months, took a worrisome turn, with the involvement of regular troops from at least eight African countries, on top of a myriad of rebels factions. Thus, this war, which some have, perhaps by derision, labelled the "First African world war", had -and perhaps still has- the potential to destabilize completely, not only Central Africa and the Great Lakes region of Africa, but the whole of Africa as well.

The conflict which is currently raging in Congo and the Great Lakes region is important and has to preoccupy all of the international community and all Africans especially, not only because it involves a hundred millions peoples or more, but also and essentially because it is happening in the heart of the continent and that it is largely undermining the prospects of development for the entire continent. It therefore is imperative that we urgently deal with it and give the best of ourselves to resolve this crisis which is more than anything else a disgrace for Africa. It is with a firm will to contribute to this collective effort that we are hereby making this appeal.

2. THE CONFLICT AND ITS CAUSES It is entirely evident that the conflict that is ravaging Congo and the Great Lakes region has its roots in the meanders of the modern history of the region and that, in retracing the thread of events, one can well go back to the Berlin Conference. But, for all practical purposes, the following, particular or general, causes may need to be emphasized:

a) A lack of legitimacy
As we have uttered it several times, since the foundation of the Congo as a modern state at the Berlin Conference in 1885, the affairs of Congo have not been the affair of the Congolese people themselves. Mr. Mobutu arrived in power on a decision of the American government and clung to it for over three decades against the will and the desire of the people of Congo. Likewise Mr. Kabila's arrival in power as much as the ADFL (Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) project itself were not a Congolese affair. It is therefore evident that the problems of Congo and the region will not be resolved as long as we will not have found a way to organize in Congo a power structure that will enjoy a broad popular legitimacy. One can always get in power by force. However, to build a lasting power structure and especially to stabilize a society, it is absolutely imperative to find a way to legitimize that power and insure that it enjoys a broad popular support. Mr. Mobutu and Mr. Kabila have failed to do this, because theirs was a totalitarian ambition inspired from without and based essentially on a simple logic of political survival. Such a logic contains always the seeds of the destruction, not only of the power it is supposed to defend, but unfortunately also of the society which is its victim. What follows is merely a chain of causes and effects which the conjuncture affects from time to time one way or the other. Indeed, when a state has been weakened to the point of being totally insignificant and incapable of defending itself even in the face of minor threats, and when a society is completely in shambles, the combined weakness of the state and the people invites the meddling by some foreign players who are naturally going to use the people, their unprotected territory and their wrecked state machinery to serve their own interests. Furthermore, with each passing crisis, their previous involvement provides them with enough grounds for getting involved in the future, as much as it offers to others a convenient pretext to get also involved. Little by little, the situation becoming, gradually, more and more -increasingly- complex and complicated with the growing numbers of players and stakes, the possibilities for a lasting and peaceful settlement grow dimmer and dimmer. This is why it is, not only important, but urgent to do everything possible to establish the indispensable political legitimacy in Congo. It is because we failed to do this at the downfall of the Mobutu regime that the Congo and the region are now wallowing in the chaos in which they are currently trapped. It follows naturally that, if we fail again to do what is necessary now, the worst is still to be feared, not only for Congo, central Africa, and the Great Lakes region, but for all of Africa.

b) A mercenary political class
As one might have expect it and this is secret to nobody, seventy-five years of colonization which have been followed by four decades of totalitarian corrupt regimes have but produced a political class which is fundamentally venal and mercenary. In sum, this class is, to a certain extent, just a reflection of the culture that both the era of mercantilist colonists and that of hedonic rulers have in the end instilled in the whole society. Thus, to give a chance to the country and to the region, steps have to be taken to develop a credible and responsible political class. Undoubtedly, as of now this is unfortunately some thing which could realistically happen only through a responsible commitment of the international community. Indeed, this is a responsibility which the international community ought not to avoid, insofar as, for all of the century that just ended, the international community, itself, has, in several ways, participated in the making of the double bankruptcy -bankruptcy of the state and bankruptcy of the society- which we are witnessing today in the Congo.

c) A militaristic conception of power
To dominate Congo and exploit it his own way, King Leopold II called on the services of "La Force Publique", which, on the whole, was a mercenary army that behaved in Congo as an occupation force. Mr. Mobutu who wanted to go down in history as the rightful successor of King Leopold II, used his army in the same way; an army which, as much as the "Force Publique" of which it was the natural offshoot, was nothing more than a fascist instrument in the hire of foreign interests. Thus, to save Congo and Africa, it will be necessary, not only to strive for a political solution, but also to devise a way of protecting the future Congolese society from all the totalitarian temptations of its military and militaristic elements. No human society has ever prospered under military boot, and Congo will not make the unique exception.

d) Resources are a curse In his book "The Challenge of the Congo", Kwame NKRUMAH was right in thinking that, of all African countries, no country faced the challenge that was that of Congo. Apart from its vastness and its strategic geo-political location, Congo's mineral resources are finally the ultimate stake in all the political and/or military confrontations that are plaguing Congo and the region. It does not need to be this way. As it is the case in other rich parts of the world, a pluralistic society open to Africa and to the world and a state of law ought to allow to put these resources, without any unnecessary and detrimental antagonism, to work for Congo, for the region, for Africa, and for the whole of the international community. Congolese did not choose to lay their feet on an affluent subsoil, and this historical accident should not become for them a source of inalienable misfortunes. The international community ought to help us reconcile Congo's legitimate interests with the -legitimate- interests of the rest of the world community.

3. THE INCONTROVERTIBLE POLITICAL SOLUTION
When we made public, on August 07 1998, the RNS eleven- point plan which is hereby attached, we had chosen to emphasize the fact that there was not going to be a military victory, even less a military solution, in Congo. Of this, we are today even more convinced than we were yesterday. A military victory by one or the other will simply sow the seeds of an unavoidable future conflict. This is why we think that the Lusaka Agreement of July 10 1999, which by the way is well in line with our eleven-point plan, offers the best possible way out. Thus, everything possible has to be done to insure its success, and we would like here to call upon all of the international community, especially upon all African heads of state and government, to do everything in their power to insure the success of the Lusaka Agreement. It is not only the future of Congo, but the future of all of Africa which is here at stake. The people of Congo and of the region have suffered sufficiently enough, and all the resources which are being squandered in those endless conflicts can be put to reasonable use. Africa which nowadays is at the bottom of humankind ladder ought not to indulge in such a squandering of its meager resources; something which, by the way, does not do us honour.

Moreover, we would like to outline here some of the points that we hold to be essential for the success of the Lusaka Agreement. Indeed, there is no doubt that, to insure the success of this agreement and the normalization of the political life in Congo, it is essential to endeavour to achieve the following:

(a) To Realize a deep and broad political consensus that will result in the unification of the armed forces and the formation of a government of national unity;

(b) To insure that the legitimate interests (political, security or other) of all the parties to the conflict will be safeguarded, at the same time that the Congolese people will be fully restored into their indisputable sovereignty;

(c) To initiate the process of the edification of judicious institutions that, will, in the long run, guarantee, not only the normalization of the political life in Congo, but also and especially peace and stability in central Africa central and the Great Lakes region; and

(d) To organize free and fair elections that everybody will be obliged to recognize, such as no one will ever again feel neither compelled nor given the pretext to rise up in arms. Undoubtedly, on this point as on many others, the continuous involvement of the international community and of the people of Congo themselves will be essential.

Evidently, in order to forge a deep and broad political consensus, the Congolese political negotiations ought to be really representative of the people of Congo; and this is a requirement which can be easily met, if there really is a genuine political will to bring together sons and daughters of Congo in a spirit of dialogue and frank collaboration to collectively work out a common solution. To strive to exclude some at this juncture or to bestow undue advantages upon others will but be counter-productive. Certes, given the fact that multi-party democratic elections have not been held in the recent history of the country and that it therefore is not easy to evaluate the political influence of various contenders, a well-balanced selection of participants that insures a real representation of all of the Congolese society will not be an easy task. However, given what is at stake, it falls to us to be as inventive as possible. In fact, we would like here to suggest that, apart from the category of official delegates, provision be made for the category of ordinary participants whereby any Congolese national, eighteen years old or more, who will wish to attend the Congolese political negotiations, accept to make in writing a motivated request supported by a curriculum vitae and be willing to defray the cost of his or her own participation, will be allowed to attend. Unlike the ordinary participant, the delegate shall have received a specific mandate to represent an organization or a group of organizations and be the one entitled to take part in special deliberations and to vote. It stands to reason that such a double categorization (in ordinary participants and delegates) will allow to ensure the broadest participation possible at the same time that it will help to curtail the overall cost of organizing the negotiation process. Furthermore, we would like to propose that each Congolese organization (political and all other) that is susceptible to document its legal and official existence to at least three months before the signing of the Lusaka Agreement be automatically entitled to at least one delegate. Such an objective criterion will prevent the risk of bestowing undue privileges on some organizations as compared to others. Certainly, reputedly major organizations could be entitled to three delegates or more. What is more and however that may be, the inter-Congolese political negotiations will not be about exercising power; in which case it might have been entirely conceivable to grant numerical pre-eminence in delegates to groups supposed to have the most important electoral influence. On the contrary, the inter-Congolese political negotiations will be about defining the political future of the country, in such a way that, in the end, those who will enjoy the trust of the people and receive a mandate from the people will wield a level of power commensurate with their electoral influence. This is what is fundamentally at stake at this juncture in the process. Thus, the desirable outcome shall not be confused with the process itself. The major concern at this juncture shall be to try to bring people together and not to exclude. By the way, we think that, in regard to this, we should draw some lessons from the Somali National Peace Conference which is now under way in Arta, Djibouti. Many an international observer agree to say that, contrary to the thirteen previous conferences which have been organized since 1991, the Arta conference is likely to succeed, because it has been open to all the Somali people, while, in the past, participation was limited to warlords. It is evident that Somalis and those who are trying to help them did finally realize that their country belongs to all Somalis and not only to warlords. It is equally important to emphasize here that at the Arta conference provision has been made to grant only three minutes of talk to anyone, whoever he is, who wants to address the conference. The principle of the equality of participants is thereby fully respected. These are assuredly highly important recommendations by which we should be all inspired for the organization of the inter-Congolese political negotiations.

Finally, we would like to seize this opportunity to emphasize additional points that appear to us particularly important:

1º The absolute necessity to counter Mr.Kabila's machinations:

To many it appears that Mr. Kabila is rejecting the Congolese political negotiations for the very simple reason that he is not assured of remaining in power at the end of the proceedings. He therefore is intent on foiling them, and this by the way is the reason behind both his unwarranted and capricious denunciation of President Masire and his determination to form a Constituent Assembly well outside of the Lusaka Agreement process. We call here on all friends and allies of Mr.Kabila to see to it that he realizes that, were he to embark on a simple logic of political survival, he will rather be ensnaring himself and dooming the country furthermore. Mr. Kabila has everything to gain and nothing to lose were he to accept to confront his fellow countrymen and ask them to entrust him for some time more with the destiny of their country. He surely would be elevated still more and enhance his chance of remaining in power, were he to show that he stands ready to refer to their will. After having won the war for America's independence in 1783, George Washington, who had the power to assert himself on a then young country, chose rather, alleging that he had fulfilled his mission, to hand over back his mandate to the Congress and get out of public life. The nobility of this act could but elevate him more in the eyes of his fellow countrymen who later on took on themselves to call on his services. Surely if he wants to deserve the trust of his fellow countrymen, Joseph-Désiré Kabila will have to show that he puts their interest above his and that he is well willing to yield to their will. If he were to do so, he would be elevated still more. In any case, everything has to be done to prevent Mr. Kabila from succeeding in his patent desire to sabotage the Lusaka Agreement. Congo and Africa matter more than his desire and the desire of his henchmen to remain in power, at any cost.

2º. The participation of the diaspora:

It is here important for us all to realize that the Congolese diaspora, i.e., the political forces and the "forces vives" (those of the civil society) currently living outside the Congolese territory, has participated, as much as the forces inside the country, in the struggle against the Mobutu regime as well as in the ongoing struggle against the totalitarian tendencies of Mr. Kabila’s regime. It therefore goes without saying that the participation of the external Congolese political and social forces in the process of political normalization in the Congo is a right, and not a favor; which right, by the way, is formally recognized in the Lusaka Agreement, insofar as reference is made globally to the political opposition and the "forces vives", thereby implying that both the internal and external forces are all concerned. In any case, it would have been totally absurd and counter- productive if reference had been made to the internal opposition exclusively. In fact, it is an incontrovertible fact of life that the liberation of a country is a struggle which more often than not is fought from both within and without, and that, for quite obvious reasons, in the history of the world the external forces have generally played a dominant role in the outcome of the struggle. In Africa alone, the case of South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda, just to name a few, is well indicative of the role that the Congolese diaspora has to play in both this struggle for freedom and the overall endeavour for the reconstruction of the country. It is furthermore necessary to recognize that, as it is the case with any diaspora - especially during the troubled periods of a nation, the Congolese diaspora is made of some of Congo's most dynamic, qualified, and credible citizens. It therefore would be totally unfortunate and detrimental for the whole process of political normalization in the Congo that such potential intellectual and human contribution be neglected. Those who speak of "diaspora" as a "group which is not mentioned in the Lusaka Agreement" are simply failing to grasp the meaning of the language used in this regard: "political opposition as well as representatives of the forces vives". Apropos, it perhaps is necessary to deplore the fact that President Masire has failed to consult with the Congolese diaspora as formally as he has done it inside the country; which probably has led some members of the internal opposition to think that the internal unarmed forces are perhaps the only ones to be reckoned with. In any case, to have fought from without and contributed effectively to the struggle is not worth less nor more than the struggle from within. What is at stake here is not to reward past sufferings: those who sacrificed their lives in this struggle will never be there to get any such reward. What is at stake here is to bring together, in a sufficiently credible manner, the representatives of all the political and civil forces of the country to chart out a new course for that beleaguered land in hopes of getting to an overall normalization of its political life. To start excluding people and groups at this juncture can but bode ill for the future. It is indeed essential for the success of the whole process that all the sons and daughters of the Congo feel concerned with the process and fairly well represented. Of course, as we stated it much earlier, since no multi-party elections were ever organized in the recent history of the country, it is very difficult to determine objectively the relative influence of each and every one of all the political entities of the Congolese society. Thus it falls on us to be as creative and imaginative as possible to insure a judicious representation without providing any groups with undue privileges.

3º. The relative composition of the official delegations to the political negotiations:
This is a very important issue, and we need to discuss it once again. It is totally imperative to ensure in this connection that delegates are going to be representative of the Congolese society as a whole. Moreover, emphasis ought to be put on quality people and those who are capable of facing up to the historical challenges and responsibilities for the future of the country. It indeed stands to reason that the selection of the official delegates ought to be made essentially to secure the future and not to legitimize the past. THE FUTURE AND NOT THE PAST IS WHAT IS AT STAKE HERE. We therefore believe strongly that the following precautions are absolutely imperative:

- Provisions have to be made to insure that representatives from the 1960s era, i.e., essentially those who have, over the last forty years, held public office, in the government or in the legislature, do not constitute more than thirty percent of the total number of official delegates. By insuring the diversity of the political generations represented and bringing in new people, thereby insuring hopefully a new outlook on the world, this will help guarantee the necessary renewal of the Congolese political life and political class as well. Certes, it is essential to recall here that only the official delegates will be entitled to participate in special deliberations and vote.

- Likewise, dignitaries from the Mobutu regime, be they from the current government, the rebellion, or the non-armed (internal and external) opposition should not represent more than half the total number of delegates. Such a diversification is essential if one wants to ensure a new era and a real opportunity for the Congo.

- With the same preoccupation for diversification at heart, it is also imperative to see to it that at least ten per cent of delegates represent the Congolese women. It is also to be hoped that at least five per cent of delegates be thirty years old or younger. Obviously, delegates in these categories too ought to be selected for their competency and qualifications and not just to fill any type of quota.

In short, this is just about defining a few simple and objective criteria which will be recommended to all the groups which will be called upon to propose delegates for the Congolese political negotiations.

4º. The necessity for an open process:
It is evident that, for funding reasons as well as for the sake of efficiency, many of qualified Congolese who otherwise might have effectively participated in the inter-Congolese political negotiations will not be allowed to do so. Even if the category of ordinary participants were to be adopted, many are those who will not be able to travel due to both financial and time constraints. It therefore would be desirable that, besides the adoption of the category of ordinary participants, provision be made to allow anyone (for that matter, Congolese national or not) who would like to do so to contribute in writing to the proceedings of the political negotiations themselves. To to be efficient and credible, such a process ought to be genuinely open. For instance and just to give one example among many, a Website could be developed to allow for a wide diffusion of the synthesis of the debates and to allow for the non-participants to make available their own written contributions.

We strongly believe that all the points which have been raised here deserve careful consideration so as to insure the success of the Lusaka Agreement process. Congolese and all the other peoples of the region have suffered a lot during the last forty years. It devolves upon us all to do whatever is in our power and take all the necessary dispositions to ensure that this one will not have been also an other failed rendezvous with history. Our responsibility, the responsibility of all those who want to play a role in determining the future of Congo and the region is an immensely dreadful one.

Undoubtedly these are very difficult and unfortunate times for Congo and the region. However, as an old saying goes it’s an ill wind that blows nobody any good. What is important today is not to deplore the past but that we do our best and make sure that light finally shine in the heart of Africa and that the future, our children’s and grand- children’s future, be different from what ours has been. Surely Congo can be still saved and the Lusaka Agreement can be made to succeed. What is needed is the determination and the political will of the people of Congo and the international community. This is why we are appealing here rousingly to all of the international community and to all of the people of good will: